Documento(s) 3 de 3

This page provides a list of selected annotated/abstracted references related to the study of common property that might be of interest to CBNRM researchers. The source of the annotation follows each entry..

IASCP Bibliographies:

Hess, Charlotte. 1996. Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography. Volume 3. Bloomington, Indiana. International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.

Martin, Fenton. 1993. Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography. Volume 2. Bloomington, Indiana. International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.

Martin, Fenton. 1989. Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography. Volume 1. Bloomington, Indiana. International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.

Note: These three volumes, along with an additional 9,000 citations, are included in IASCP`s recently completed Comprehensive Bibliography of Common Pool Resources, a database which is available both on CD-ROM and from their website at http://www.indiana.edu/~iascp/aboutcprbib.html

1. Acharya, H.P. 1989. Jirel Property Arrangements and the Management of Forest Resources in Highland Nepal. Development Anthropology Network 7(2):16-25. Institute for Development Anthropology. Binghamton, USA.

Abstract: The author examines the major aspects of property arrangements in and around the Jiri river valley in Dolakha District and the impact of these arrangements on forest and pasture management. In Jiri, property rights to wood and fodder are very complex and cannot be well comprehended by lumping them grossly as 'forests' and 'pastures', or as 'communal', 'private' or 'state property'. Not only are additional forms of ownership (e.g. joint and cooperative) widespread but rights differ according to the particular resource, kinship, residence, purpose, previous use and season. The author describes the influence of government rules and acts, the joint ownership system and usufruct rights, symbolic methods of protection, the management of conflicts, property arrangements in the neighbourhood and some policy implications. Even with increased external pressures, the Jirel people have maintained a balance between the use of wood and its sustainable availability in the forest. The diversified and differentiated property arrangements practised by the Jirel people have positive effects on use, availability, distribution and conflicts associated with forest and pasture resources and should be supported and strengthened. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

2. Acheson, J.M. 1988. The Lobster Gangs of Maine. University Pressof New England, Hanover, and London.

Notes: A classic work, in which an anthropologist describes the working world of lobstermen in Maine, focusing on how local resource management schemes have contributed to the overall sustainability of the local lobster fishing industry over the past several decades. In the US, marine resources belong to all citizens but are controlled by state governments as a public trust. Government has found it difficult, however, to control access to common property marine resources such as the lobster fishery. Nevertheless, some local groups of users are able to restrict access on their own, relying on a system of traditional fishing rights in which lobster fishermen must be accepted by the community in order to gain the right to fish. Once accepted, a lobsterman is only allowed to fish in the territory held by the community, and interlopers are usually discouraged through violence. The author found that lobstermen fishing in these exclusive territorities caught more and better-sized lobsters with less work than those fishing in less-protected areas.

3. Adger, W. Neil; Kelly, Mick; Ninh, Nguyen Huu; Thanh, Ngo Cam. 1997. Property Rights and The Social Incidence of Mangrove Conversion in Vietnam. Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment. CSERGE Working Paper GEC 97-21. London, UK.

Abstract: The distribution of economic benefits from wetlands is fundamentally determined by ownership and control of resources, and hence the property rights and institutional setting of analysis is critical in determining the ecological sustainability of management practices. In the last decade it has been recognized that wetlands, in common with many coastal resources can, given certain circumstances, be sustainably managed under common property regimes. Conversion to private or state property does not necessarily enhance sustainability, and in fact often precipitates the incentives for unsustainable management. This occurs when the conversion process changes the parameters of common property management such as the location of beneficiaries; the equitable distribution of benefits; and the reliance on the sustainable resource within the livelihood system. The paper discusses the significance of the recent advances in the understanding of common property resource management in the context of external changes in management, for example through state appropriation or privatization. Inequality and the diversity of income sources from private and communally managed resources are important factors in determining whether transactions costs can be reduced and hence whether common property resources can be effectively managed. A case study is presented to examine whether privatization of common property resources impacts on equality within the general population of resource users and non-users, and the impact of changes in equality on the common property resource management. This is centered on mangrove conversion for private agriculture and aquaculture in Quang Ninh Province, northern Vietnam. Land conversion creates a diversity of impacts and livelihood strategies. The results focus on the impact of changing state, private and communal property rights on the identified stakeholders. An appraisal of the incidence of costs and benefits of conversion is undertaken, demonstrating that state intervention for efficiency objectives can only be justified if both the environmental externalities and the distributional consequences of conversion are ignored. (authors)

4. Agarwal, Bina. 1997. Editorial: Re-Sounding the Alert - Gender Resources and Community Action. World Development. Vol. 25(9):1373-1380.

Abstract: The author argues that despite a call over the past two decades for a more gender-sensitive approach to development analysis, gender continues to be viewed as a "special interest" issue whose incorporation into projects and programs has been piecemeal at best. She offers an examination of two major resource-related issues-- community participation in resource management and the allotment of land under agrarian reform schemes--to show how women continue to be virtually excluded from new strategies for community development. She asserts that biases which favour males still persist when it comes to deciding who gets what resources, who participates in what, and who has the decision-making powers over communal resources. (author adapted)

5. Agrawal, A. 1997. Forest Management Under Common Property Regimes in the Kumaon Himalaya. In People and Participation in Sustainable Development. G. Shivakoti et al (eds.). Proceedings of an International Conference held at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, Rampur, Chitwan, Nepal, 17-21 March 1996. Bloomington, Indiana and Rampur, Chitwan.

Abstract: This paper explores local level forest use and management in the Kumaon Himalaya. It seeks to situate the ongoing research on forest resource use in the Kumaon Himalaya in the context of a larger conversation on common property use and management in mountain regions. More specifically, it examines why it is necessary to look at communities as relevant units of social organization for understanding resource use; the need to analyze the effects on resource use of stratification and differences within communities; and the importance of subjecting concepts such as "community", "local", and "indigenous" to further reflection and refinement. (author)

6. Anderson, E.N. 1990. Religious Representation of Common Property Management. Paper presented at First Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Duke University, Durham, NC. 

Notes: Scientists and economistshave consistently undervalued the power that religion can play in promoting patterns of resource conservation. Even adopting the most parochial definition of religion possible, many examples of conservation based in religious principles are available. InChina large groves of trees have been preserved because of the spirits that inhabit them. Religion taps our most base emotional concerns for society, safety and autonomy while simultaneously coding ecological information in a manner that is easy to retrieve. Clearly, religion alone is an insufficient force of preservation. History has shown that strong material needs, ideologies such as communism and capitalism, and modernization have all overwhelmed the influence of religion. In addition, religion itself has been changed over time so it no longer contains the ecological focus it once had. Today religion can still play an important role in motivating individuals with good intentions to act. One of the greatest forces humans possess are emotions. Emotionsin fact are often strong enough to override any semblance of rationality. Religion has the responsibility of tapping and controlling these emotions for the purpose of resource conservation. (Tepper, 1991)

7. Arnold, J.E.M.,and Stewart, W.C.1989. Common Property Resource Management in India. Tropical Forestry Papers No. 24. Oxford Forestry Institute, University of Oxford, Department of Plant Sciences.

Abstract: The authors review the state-of-knowledge regarding CPRM in India, based on published and unpublished sources and discussions with researchers. In the 19^th century, up to two-thirds of the land in India was under community control, but privatization and government appropriation have reduced this share. Many traditional and indigenous forms of CPRM have weakened or collapsed. The condition of remaining CPRs, factors influencing the value of CPRs, institutional requisites for CPRM and some promising approaches are reviewed. The authors conclude that, despitethe erosion of CPRs and CPRM regimes, they still play a very important role in agricultural systems and in the livelihoods of the poor. In order to make progress towards sustainable CPRM it will be necessary to give high priority to correcting policy, legal anomalies and weaknesses which undermine CPRM arrangements or which encourage further privatization. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993) 

8. Ascher, William. 1995. Communities and Sustainable Forestry in Developing Countries. San Francisco: ICSPress.

Notes: Who has the right to exploit forest products? Why have reforestation efforts fallen short? As the pressure on forest resources increases, so does the importance of answering these questions. Through case studies and design principles, Ascher demontrates that local users are the most appropriate managers of forest resources because they have a vested interest in the forest's long-term sustainability. (publisher)

9. Attwater, Roger. 1997. Process, Property and Patrons: Land Reform in Upland Thai Catchments. Gatekeeper Series No. SA69. International Institute for Environment and Development. 

Abstract: This paper presents a case study of an upland catchment in Thailand which is currently undergoingland reform. It describes how soft systems methodology can identify and stimulate collaborative property arrangements between villagers, government agencies and commercial interests. A number of collaborative actions have developed as a result, and include local collective management of a water supply; partnerships relating to elements of conservation and production within the local agroecosystems; and socially legitimate patronage to support formal protocols of land reform. The success of these collaborative arrangements lies partly in the fact that entitlements and management were developed within existing social and bureaucratic conventions. (author)

10. Baker, J. Mark. 1997. Common Property Resource Theory and the Kuhl Irrigation Systems of Himachal Pradesh, India. Human Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2. 

Abstract: This article analyses the differential stresses of increasing nonfarm employment on 39 gravity flow irrigation systems (kuhls) in Himachal Pradesh, India. By fragmenting common dependence on agriculture, increasing nonfarm employment has created stresses within kuhl regimes which manifest as declining participation, increased conflict, and the declining legitimacy of customary rules and authority structures. However, these effects are not evenly distributed across all kuhl regimes. To explain how and why some kuhl regimes have persisted without changing, why most have transformed and endure, and why a few have collapsed andare now managed by the state irrigation department, the author uses insights from current theories of common property resource systems to guide the development of an inductively derived explanatory framework. The author demonstrates how the relative degree of differentiation of the regime members and the extent of members' reliance on kuhl water interact to influence the degree and nature of stress on kuhl regimes resulting from nonfarm employment, the nature of the regime`s response to stress, and the efficacy of the responses. The framework accounts for the temporal and spatial variation of kuhl regimes in their degree of role specialization and organizational formalization, and the extent of state involvement in kuhl management. (publisher)

11. Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 1994. Should Common Property Resources be Privatized? A Re-Examination of the Tragedy of the Commons. Cahiers de la Faculté des Sciences Economiques etSociales, No. 143. Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultés Universitaire Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium.

12. Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is there a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Food and Agriculture Organization and Clarendon Press.

Abstract: The book is in two parts. Part I deals with the analytical propositions of economic theory, and game theory in particular, while Part II reviews lessons learned from several decades of socio-anthropological, empirical research on local-level natural resource management. The authors are motivated by the twofold conviction that too many economic theorists have ignored the findings of empirical research and "therefore remain unable to make a valid judgement on the empirical relevance of their analytical propositions" (p.1), while applied researchers often fail to draw on theory in order to more precisely specify the problem and more rigorously formulate hypotheses to be tested. The basic premise of the book is to bridge this gap between theoretical and empirical research in the study of natural resource management, and to take stock of their combined achievements to date. This book is an attempt to bridge the gap between the enormous amount of empirical literature documenting efforts at managing local-level resources and the quickly growing body of theoretical knowledge dealing with natural resource management. By building a unifying framework, the authors aim to better define the conditions of success or failure of various forms of resource management at the village level. Contrary to a common view, according to which mismanagement of such resources is to be ascribed to direct users falling prey to "the tragedy of the commons", they convincingly argue that there are other important potential explanations, such as lack of awareness about ecological effects of human activities, poverty and heavy discounting of future income streams, uncertainty over future property rights and prices of natural products, and availability of more attractive income opportunities. Moreover, even when mismanagement practices obviously result from strategic interactions among users, many anthropological writings have pointed at crucial aspects that are bypassed by the characterization in terms of the classical Prisoner's Dilemma. (Review in The Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 33, No.6. Oxford University Press.)

13. Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 1997. Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons: The Unregulated Case. Oxford Economic Papers 49: 451-482.

14. Beck, Tony and Cathy Nesmith. 1999. Building on poor people's capacities: the case of common property resources in India and West Africa. Paper presented at a World Bank Conference on "Poverty, environment, growth linkages" Washington DC, 24-25th March 1999

Abstract: This paper examines the relation between poor women and men and common property resources (cprs) from a number of different perspectives. It identifies cprs as a crucial element of poor people's coping and adaptive strategies, and locates poor people's use of cprs within a wider focus on sustainable livelihoods, which argues that development initiatives need to build on poor people's assets and strengths. It considers evidence from India and West Africa with a particular focus on poverty reduction, equity, gender and management issues. The paper discusses the potential of different policy and project interventions in terms of their likely support of poor people's access to cprs. And it offers suggestions for future research on poor people and cprs. Development agencies and governments which have re-focusedtheir attention on poverty in recent years will find that cprs provide an entry point to understanding poor people's perceptions of poverty and for building on poor people's capacities. (authors)

15. Berkes, F. 1986. Local-level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of Turkish Coastal Fisheries. Marine Policy 10:215-229.

16. Berkes, Fikret. 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community- Based Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.

Notes: This is a classic, wide-ranging survey of the role and importance of natural resources held in common ownership and the issues raised by their conservation as a key element of sustainable economic development. Theoretical problems and case studies are presented by several authors. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

Contents: 1- Introduction and Overview. PART 1 PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMONS DEBATE: 2- Institutional Arrangements for Management of Rural Resources: Common Property Regimes; 3- Natural Resources: Access, Rights-to-Use and Management; 4- The Evolution of Appropriate Resource Management Systems;  5- Cooperation from the Perspective of Human Ecology. PART 2 CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: 6- Graphs and Gaffs: A Cautionary Tale in the Common Property Resources Debate; 7- Reforming the Use of Natural Resources; 8- Multi-Jurisdictional Resources: Testing a Typology for Problem Structuring; 9- Meeting Environmental Concerns Caused by Common Property Mismanagement in Economic Development Projects. PART 3 SINGLE RESOURCE CASE STUDIES: 10- Solving the Common Property Dilemma: Village Fisheries Rights in Japanese Coastal Waters; 11- The Evolution of Mexico`s Spiny Lobster Fishery; 12- Where Have All the Exploiters Gone? Co-management of the Maine Lobster Industry; 13- Water as Common Property: The Case of Irrigation Water Rights in the Philippines. PART 4 MULTIPLE-RESOURCE CASES AND INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT: 14- On the Diversification of Common Property Resource Use by Indian Society; 15- Changes Taking Place in Common Property Resource Management in the Inland Niger Delta of Mali; 16- Traditional Resource Management in the Melanesian South Pacific: A Development Dilemma.

17. Blaikie, Piers M., and Brookfield, Harold C. 1987. Common Property Resources and Degradation World-Wide. In Blaikie, P., and Brookfield, H. (eds.), Land Degradation and Society. Pp. 186-196. London: Methuen.

Abstract: The authors describe howand why CPRs are particularly vulnerable to degradation. The paper provides a definition of CPRs and describes a framework which links resources to management. Social interaction between users and outcomes in terms of maintenance or degradation of resources, relations between private and common lands and the role of the state are discussed. Changes in CPR decision-making and management are analysed as well. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

18. Blair, Harry W. 1996. Democracy, Equity and Common Property Resource Management in the Indian Subcontinent. Development and Change, Vol. 27: 475-499. 

Abstract: This article addresses the relationship between democracy, equity and common property resource management in South Asia, both at the national and at the local level. Its substantive focus is largely on forests, and its geographical concentration mostly on India, although other sectors (primarily water) and areas (Nepal and Bangladesh) are also included. The article opens by looking at Garrett Hardin's (1968) three strategies to preserve the commons. It finds that democratic politics is compatible with both privatization and centralization as conserving strategies (although not necessarily successful). With the third approach--local control--democracy has at best a problematic relationship, for where governmental units are the relevant actors, there tends to be more interest in consuming than in conserving or preserving resources at the local level. Local users groups, however,do much better at common property resource management, because they can restrict membership and thus avoid free riders, and they can establish a close linkage in their members' minds between benefits and costs of participating in group discipline to maintain the resource. (author)

19. Blomquist, William; Schlager, Edella; Tang, S.Y. 1991. All CPRs are not Created Equal: Two Important Physical Characteristics and their Relation to the Resolution of Commons Dilemmas. Paper presented atthe Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) Conference. University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MN. Canada, 26-30 September. 

Abstract: Policy prescriptions offered in the now-voluminous literature on common-pool resources (CPRs) frequently focus upon the strategic situation of resource users, paying relatively less attention (or none at all) to the characteristics of the common-pool resources themselves. In short, most contributions to the policy literature presume that all CPRs are alike. Based on our reconsideration of the strategic situations users face, and our empirical observation of three kinds of CPRs--fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins--we conclude that two physical characteristics of CPRs have vital implications for the likelihood of successful resolution of difficulties over resource use, and for the types of resolutions users develop. Those physical characteristics are the degree of stationarity of flow units and the existence of storage capacity. Speaking generally, fisheries are CPRs with fugitive flow units and without storage capacity, irrigation systems have fugitive flow units but possible availability of storage, and groundwater basins have relatively stationary flow units and storage capacity. Using comparisons among these types of CPRs, we analyze the effects of these physical characteristics upon the prospects for the emergence of successful cooperation in resource use. (authors)

20. Bromley, D.W. 1986. On Common Property Regimes. A paper presented at the ICIMOD/EARP/AKRSP workshop on Institutional Development for Local Management of Rural Resources, Gilgit, Pakistan. International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Abstract: The author establishes the basic terms and concepts essential for discussing CPRM systems. For collective goods, those provided by groups for their own benefit, management systems require not only appropriate institutional arrangements (property rights) but also organizational arrangements (group management structures) which, together, create the common property regimes. The functions of CPR regimes are discussed, including defining who is a member of the group and how decisions are made. Four criteria for success of CPR regimes are recognized: (1) the degree to which views on outcomes and equity are shared by members; (2) the amount of effort expended to achieve compliance; (3) the capacity to cope collectively with unexpected perturbations in the short run; and (4) the capacity to adjust to new scarcities, problems and priorities over the long run. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

21. Bromley, D. W., and Cernea, M.M. 1989. The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 57. Washington, DC.

22. Bromley, D. W. 1990. The Commons, Property and Common Property Regimes. Paper presented at the First International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) Conference, Durham, NC.

Notes: Scholars and policy makers alike have repeatedly confused and misused the terms commons, common property and common property resources. Properly defined, property is not an object, but a benefit stream that defines an individual in relation to something of value. Common property refers simply to one of several existing authority structures that utilize a resource. Theauthor describes the four main authority regimes used to control property rights to natural resources: state property, individual property, common property, and open access. He concludes that common property regimes are widely used and often successful methods of using common resources. Often, problems attributed to common property are, in fact, open access situations and should be treated as such. (adapted from Tepper, 1991)

23. Bromley, Daniel W., et al. (eds.). 1992. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Notes:This volume demonstrates the ability of disparate communities to use common property effectively and sustainably, without the need for privatization or state intervention. First, the concepts underlying the collective management of common property are introduced. Then case studies from around the world demonstrate how collective systems function under diverse conditions with reasonable success. Implications for further research and for effective policy formulation are also explored. (Leblanc, 1994)

Contents: PART 1 COMMON PROPERTY AS AN INSTITUTION: 1. The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes; 2. Common Property and Collective Action in EconomicDevelopment; 3. Analysing the Commons: A Framework. PART 2 CASE STUDIES OF COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES: 4. Management of Traditional Commons Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan; 5. Commonfield Agriculture: The Andes and Medieval England Compared; 6. Institutional Dynamics: The Evolution and Dissolution of Common-Property Resource Management; 7. Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey; 8. Sea Tenure in Bahia, Brazil; 9. Common-Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages; 10. Oukaimedene, Morocco: A High Mountain Agdal; 11. The Management and Use of Common-Property Resources in Tamil Nadu, India. PART 3 TOWARD A THEORY OF THE COMMONS: 12. Where Do We Go From Here? Implications for the Research Agenda; 13. The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property Institutions.

24. Brox, O. 1990. The Common Property Theory: Epistemological Status and Analytical Utility. Human Organization Vol. 49:3.

Notes: The common property theorem expounded originally by Hardin and a few others has caused an enormous and divisive argument among academics. Economists hold fast to the mathematical and logical reality of CPT while social scientists and anthropologists dismiss it as an invalidated hypothesis. The tremendous amount of literature today shows that while Hardin et al. did not provide a complete and irrevocable idea, it cannot be dismissed out of hand. In order to resolve some of the present debate and provide grounds forhelpful discussion an epistemological analysis is required of CPT. The results indicate that while it is not a truth, it can be an important analytical tool. It should be used to ask questions and open our eyes to factors we have not seen before. A presentation of work in North Norway illustrates how this is possible. A possible risk to consider is the theory also works to blind an individual to possible benefits of the commons. Results of the case study indicate that the problems of the commons are (a) how to maintain open access; (b) keep the aggregate level of exploitation down; and (c) avoid dissipation of the resource rent through zero-sum competition. (Tepper, 1991)

25. Buck, S.J. 1989. Multi-Jurisdictional Resource: Testing a Typology for Problem-Structuring. In Berkes, F., (ed.) Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.

Abstract: Marine fisheries are a common property resource with special biological characteristics: they are both renewable and fugitive, with habitats that range from freshwater rivers to the high seas. Because of these biological characteristics, marine fisheries must be managed in multiple and often antagonistic political jurisdictions. To clarify the management options peculiar to fisheries resources, a typology of common property resources is developed. The components of the typology are the nature of the resource (fugitive-renewable); the migratory pattern of the fishery (unshared stock, shared stock, highly migratory, anadromous, or high seas); the property right in the fishery (non-transferable or transferable, non-exclusive or exclusive); and the scale of the user pool (traditional, localized, regional, national or multinational). The typology is then applied to Chesapeake Bay fisheries as a demonstration of its usefulness in examining institutional arrangements in fisheries management. (Tepper, 1991)

26. Burger, Joanna and Gochfeld, Michael. 1998. TheTragedy of the Commons: Thirty Years Later. Environment, Vol. 40 (10):4-27.

27. Cernea, Michael M. 1981. Land Tenure Systems and Social Implications of Forestry Development Programs. World Bank Staff Working Paper 452. Washington, DC.

Notes: The author describes a World Bank project in Pakistan in which, despite assumptions to the contrary, community control of the project land had over time been supplanted by individual wealthy families who now controlled the land and therefore were the project beneficiaries. The project is a clear warning about the necessity of determining the de facto as well as the de jure status of land. (editors)

28. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Siegfried V., and Bishop, Richard C.1975. Common Property as a Concept on Natural Resource Policy. Natural Resources Journal 15: 713-727.

Abstract: Institutions based on the concept of 'common property' have played socially-beneficial roles in natural resource management from economic pre-history up to the present. These same institutions promise help in solving pressing resource problems in both the developed and developing countries. This classic article discusses the policy implications of common property in the solution of natural resource policy problems. The article reviews common property as a social institution, the social framework of common property institutions and the commons in economic history. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

29. Cleary, Mark; Eaton, Peter. 1996. Tradition and Reform. Land Tenure and Rural Development in South-East Asia. Oxford University Press. 

Notes: The majority of the population of South-east Asia depends on the land for its living. Land is held in a multitude of different ways--through tribal custom, as individual owner-occupier units, through plantations. In many parts of the region landlessness is a major social and political issue. Using a wide range of case studies, this book examines the different landholding systems of the region and argues that a combination of traditional and reformed tenure systems offers the best prospects for improving the welfare of the rural population. (publisher)

30. Dove, M.R. and Rao, A.L. 1986. Common Property Resource Management in Pakistan: Garrett Hardin in the Junglat. Environment and Policy Institute (EAPI) Discussion Paper. East-West Center. University of Hawaii. Honolulu, USA.

Abstract: Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" is analysed in the context of three case studies from South Asia. The analysis suggests that Hardin's argument is incorrect since, in Bromley's terms, it applied to open access resources, not common property. The authors describe two social forestry projects in Pakistan and suggest that utilizing existing, traditional but still powerful local institutions provides possible solutions to the problems of creating new institutional arrangements. Three case studies in traditional CPRM are given: (1) an analysis of livestock and rangeland management in Baluchistan, Pakistan; (2) an analysis of livestock systems in Rajasthan, India; and, (3) a study of tribal tenure in Swat, Pakistan. These cases demonstrate the capacity of CPR systems to promote sustainable use of environmental resources when supported by strong, traditional tribal sanctions. When traditional institutional arrangements are removed, people abandon the balanced use of natural resources. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

31. Edwards, Victoria M., and Steins, Nathalie A. 1998. Developing an Analytical Framework for Multiple-Use Commons. Journal of Theoretical Politics 10(3): 347-383.

Abstract: Much of the work on common-pool resources has tended to focus on 'single-use' commons, where the resource system is used for extraction of a single 'use' unit. However, as traditional commons evolve, research that explains the persistence of common-pool resources with multiple ownership, use and management structures will become increasingly relevant. This paper extends the analytical framework put forward by Oakerson (1992), for application to multiple-use common-pools, where multiple types of use are made of the resource system. Four components are introduced:  (1) multiple-use analysis of physical and technical attributes; (2) multilevel analysis of decision-making arrangements; (3) social characteristics of the broad user community; and (4) analysis of contextual factors. The multiple-use framework facilitates the understanding of multiple-use commons in a chosen time period and institutional change over time. The example of the New Forest commons in England is used to explain the operation of the framework in a field setting. (authors)

32. Farrington, John and Boyd, Charlotte. 1997. Scaling up the Participatory Management of Common Pool Resources. Development Policy Review Vol. 15(4):371-391. Overseas Development Institute.

Abstract : The article first briefly reviews `new ecology` arguments that resource degradation is not occurring. Second, it scans the range of agro-ecological contexts in which natural resource (NR) rehabilitation is being attempted; it then briefly examines the economic and social gains typically achievable from NR rehabilitation. Third, it turns to specific questions of the role of livestock and related inputs and outputs in the more intensive management of the interface between CPR and private agricultural resources. Fourth, before focusing on lessons for scaling up in one of these contexts (micro-watersheds), it examines why concepts of joint action and participation have been--and are likely to remain--central to NR rehabilitation. Fifth, it examines a case from India in which preconditions for scaling up of participatory approacheswere identified at the outset of a major donor-funded programme and activities modified in the light of experience in trying to meet these preconditions. Sixth, it briefly compares the scaling-up approach pursued by the Indian case study with a comparable case in Kenya, and with UK-supported micro-watershed rehabilitation in India. (authors)

33. Feeny, David; Berkes, Fikret; McCay, Bonnie J.; and Acheson, James M. 1989. The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later. Human Ecology Vol. 18(1):1-19.

Notes: Most public opinion of common property is formed by Hardin's theory "The tragedy of the commons". This economic theory suggests that people will automatically degrade any resource that is not state- or privately-owned. Today the viability of common property resources is being reconsidered. CPR is defined as (1) any resource in which exclusion of other individuals is hard; and (2) a situation in which use by one person detracts from what is available for others. Four property regimes are analysed for their ability to exclude others and regulate use. Open access regimes fulfil Hardin's prophesy of exploitation beyond a sustainable level. However, state, private and communal ownership are all capable of excluding non-members and regulating use (as supported by case studies). Common property resources are more complex than originally envisioned. They depend on decision-making arrangements, patterns of interaction, physical attributes and property rights regimes. (Tepper, 1991)

34. Ford Foundation. 1998. Forestry for Sustainable Rural Development. A Review of Ford Foundation-Supported Community Forestry Programs in Asia.  New York: Ford Foundation.

Notes:: The community forestry programs reviewed in this report represent 15 years of experience in six Asian countries that contain more than half the world`s population. In recent years the Ford Foundation`s largest commitments in Asia have been for programs focused on the nexus between rural poverty andresources. These programs have sought to improve the incomes and welfare of poor rural households through more productive, participatory, sustainable, and equitable management of land, water, and forest resources. Common to these programs have been efforts to give rural households secure access to natural resources; to help the responsible government units--forest departments, irrigation agencies, and fisheries bureaus--redefine their role as facilitators of development rather than the "doers" of development; and to empower local communities to play a more effective role in resource management. These Asian community forestry programs represent a rich mine of experience from which to draw lessons, identify future challenges, and guide priorities in the worldwide search for a path to sustainable development. (publisher) 

Contents: PART 1 OVERVIEW: 1. Approaches the Ford Foundation Has Supported in the Field of Community Forestry in Asia. PART 2 THE ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY: 2. Access and Rights to Forest Products and Land for Local People;  3. Community-Based Organizations for Forest Management; 4. Multiple-Use Management of the Forest Resource; 5. Institutional Change and New Collaborative Relationships; 6. Nongovernmental Organizations and Research Institutions: Their Roles; 7. The Development and Application of New Social Science Methodologies in Community Forestry. PART 3 CONCLUSION: 8. Important Lessons; Key Challenges; The Path to Sustainable Development.

35. Fortmann, Louise; and Bruce, John W. (eds.). 1988. Whose Trees? Proprietary Dimensions of Forestry. Boulder, CO, USA: Westview Press. 

Notes: This derives from work at the Land Tenure Centre (University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA) andICRAF (Nairobi, Kenya) to identify, review and annotate the literature on rights in trees and land with trees and the impact of those rights on planting and conservation of trees. The book begins with an essay on why tree and land tenure matter and concludes with a discussion of the "daily struggle" for rights in trees and land with trees. In Chapters 2-8, the authors provide excerpts and whole works from 39 sources worldwide. Each piece begins with a short annotation. The topics are: tree tenure; tree and tenure interactions; communities and trees; tenure and deforestation; tenure and afforestation; the gender division of tenure; and the state and the forest. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

36. Gadgil, M. 1989. On the Diversification of Common-Property Resource Use by Indian Society. In Berkes, F. (ed.). Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.

Notes: The different endogamous groups of Indian caste society have so diversified their patterns of resource use that many specialized resources--such as palm leaves for mat weaving--were, and often still are, the monopoly of one particular group in any given locality. Other more commonly used resources, such as fuelwood, were controlled by small multi-caste village communities in which the different caste groups were linked to each other in a web of reciprocity. This organization had favoured sustainable use of common property resources under communal management by Indian society until the colonial conquest. British rule led to disruption of communal organization and converted communally-managed resources into open-access resources. These have subsequently been used in an exhaustive fashion. However, pockets of goodresource management under communal control have persisted and are now serving as models for the reassertion of such communal control. It is hoped that this would contribute significantly towards bringing about a sustainable use of the country's natural resource base. (Tepper, 1991)

37. Ganjanapan, Anan. 1996. State Conservation Policy and the Complexity of Local Control of Forest Land in Northern Thailand. A paper prepared for the sixth International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) Conference at the University of California, Berkeley, June 5-8.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the contradictions of state policies on forest conservation in several watershed areas of Northern Thailand. It analyzes the state's inability to deal with local complexity, especially overlapping access to forest land and resources. The paper also addresses the local response to these policies. (author)

38. Gordon, H. Scott. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62: 124-142.

39. Hanna, Susan and Munasinghe, Mohan. (eds.). 1995. Property Rights and the Environment. The Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics and TheWorld Bank. Stockholm and Washington, DC.

40. Hanna, Susan; Folke, Carl; Mailer, Karl-Goran. (eds.). 1996. Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Washington, DC: Island Press. 

Notes: This book is about the human use of nature. More specifically, it is about the systems of rights, rules, and responsibilities that guide and control the human use of the natural environment. The chapters in this book comprise products of the research program "Property Rights and the Performance of Natural Resource Systems" conducted at the Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics in Sweden. Its goal is to further the scientific understanding of ways humans relate to their natural environments through the structure, function, and context of property-rights regimes. The papers that were the foundation for the chapters in this book were originally written to provide background to participants in the Beijer Institute`s research program on the different dimensions of property rights and the environment: the interface between social and ecological systems; the structure and formation of property rights; culture and economic development; and property rights at different scales. The book is therefore divided into four sections reflecting these same categories. (editors)

Contents: 1. Property Rights and the Natural Environment. PART I THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: 2. The Structure and Function of Ecological Systems in Relation to Property Rights Regimes; 3. Human Use of the Natural Environment: An Overview of Social and Economic Dimensions; 4. Dynamics of (Dis) harmony in Ecological and Social Systems; 5. Social Systems, Ecological Systems, and Property Rights. PART II THE STRUCTURE AND FORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: 6. Common and Private Concerns; 7. The Formation of Property Rights; 8. The Economics of Control and the Cost of Property Rights.  PART III CULTURE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS:  9. Culture and Property Rights; 10. Property Rights and Development.  PART IV PROPERTY RIGHTS AT DIFFERENT SCALES: 11. Common-Property Regimes as a Solution to Problems of Scale and Linkage; 12. Rights, Rules, and Resources in International Society; 13. Building Property Rights for Transboundary Resources.

41. Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, Vol. 162: 1243-1248.

Notes: This classic article by Hardin outlines his theory of The Tragedy of the Commons and its relation to population growth. In today's society we rely on technology to solve our problems. Unfortunately, there exists a series of problems which cannot be solved by technology--populationgrowth serving as a prime example. It appears impossible that man will reach the optimum level of growth and automatically stop. Equally unlikely is that pleas to conscience or feelings of guilt will alleviate the problems. The reason for population growth can be parallelled in cause and result in an open field for grazing. A shepherd will always add one more sheep to commonly- owned fields because his benefit is greater than his personal cost, which is divided among all users. Therefore, everyone is locked into a system of over-exploitation for personal gain. A similar scenario explains the growing problem of pollution. Since temperance is difficult to legislate, it appears private or public ownership is the only alternative. The existing welfare state means that parents can have the full benefits of having children and share the cost with the rest of society. This will automatically lead to a population above what is desirable. We must adopt policies of mutually agreed upon coercion to inhibit people'sfecundity. (Tepper, 1991)

42. Hardin, G. and Baden, J. (eds.). 1977. Managing the Commons. San Francisco, CA, USA: Freeman and Co. 

Notes: An anthology of readings that explore the implications of Hardin's "tragedy of the commons". The 'commons' are the world's common resources; the 'tragedy'--the 'remorseless inherent logic'--is that it is clearly to an individual's advantage to exploit a common resource as thoroughly as possible. The first two parts (Discovering the Commons, and The Growing Awareness) trace the development of the concept of the commons, especially with respect to increasing population pressure. The third part (Grappling with the Commons) focuses on ways in which the potentially destructive cultural norm of independence of individual action, regarded as the 'cause' of the tragedy, may be changed to promote continued human welfare and survival. Most examples refer to commons in the United States. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993) 

43. Hardin, Garrett. 1991. The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons: Population and the Disguises of Providence, in Andelson, R.V. (Ed.). Commons Without Tragedy. Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble.

44. Hviding, Edward and GrahamBaines. 1992. Fisheries Management in the Pacific: Tradition and the Challenges of Development in Marovo, Solomon Islands. Discussion Paper. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Abstract: This paper examines a case of traditional fisheries-related resource management; a case in which local people, from a basis of traditional, 'common property' control over the seas and its resources, handle a multitude of development issues. Presenting first some important issues relating to people's role in fisheries management and to the 'common property' debate, the authors then describe a traditional system for management of land and sea resources in a Pacific Islands society - that of Marovo Lagoon, Solomon Islands. Emphasis is given to fisheries resources, with a view to explaining in practical terms how the customary marine tenure system operates under the social, political, economic and ecological circumstances of change arising from development pressures. Against this background, assessments are made of the viability of this traditional fisheries management system under present conditions of centralized political control and of both external and internal pressures for large-scale resource development enterprises. (Leblanc, 1994)

45. Jodha, Narpat S. 1987. The Degradation of Common Property Resources: a Case of the Degradation of Common Property Resources in India. In Blaikie, P. and Brookfield H. (eds.) Land Degradation and Society. Pp. 196-207. London, UK: Methuen. 

Abstract: The problem of land degradation is particularly severe in rural CPRs, which constitute a significant proportion of total land resources in the semi-arid regions. The author describes the situation in Rajasthan, where control over CPRs was exercised through a landlord who could impose charges on access and produce. A land reform conducted in the early 1950s removed this system of control, encouraging over-exploitation and depletion. There is no private cost of using CPRs anymore and, consequently, CPRs have declined. This resulted in soil erosion and redistribution of land resources, ultimately disadvantaging the poor. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

46. Jodha, Narpat. S. 1995. Common Property Resources and the Dynamics of Rural Poverty in India's Dry Regions. Unasylva 180. Vol.46: 23-29.

Notes: This article considers common property resources in dry regions of India. It is based on a study covering 80 villages in 20 districts of six states. The article first presents village-level evidence regarding the dependence of poor households on common property resources, a second section comments on their decline and causal factors, while the final section examines public interventions involving rural poor and common property resources. (author)

47. Kaul, Minoti Chakravarty. 1996. Common Lands and Customary Law: Institutional Change in North India over the Past Two Centuries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: This book seeks to dispel the notion that communally- held resources are necessarily open to private exploitation and misuse. It argues that customary law and institutions of property rights were devised by village communities to check the misuse of common property resources. (publisher)

48. Keohane, Robert O.and Ostrom, Elinor (eds.). 1994. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains. London: Sage Publications.

Notes: This volume offers a synthesis of what is known about very large and very small common-pool resources. Individuals using commons at the global or local level may find themselves in a similar situation. At an international level, states cannot appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce agreements they make to cooperate with one another. In some small-scale settings, participants may be just as helpless in calling on distant public officials to monitor and enforce their agreements. Scholars have independentlydiscovered self-organizing regimes which rely on implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures rather than the command and control of a central authority. The contributors discuss the possibilities and dangers of scaling up and scaling down. They explore the impact of the number of actors and the degree of heterogeneity among actors on the likelihood of cooperative behaviour. (editors)

49. Knudsen, A.J. 1995. Living with the Commons: Local Institutions for Natural ResourceManagement. Chr. Michelsen Institute. Bergen, Norway. 

Abstract: Garrett Hardin`s essay "The Tragedy of the Commons" has for almost three decades stimulated research on common property regimes. This report provides an overview of this research and reviews a selection of empirical and theoretical contributions to the "commons" debate. Despite the hectic research activity, the report is critical of the tendency to reproduce well-worn arguments instead of questioning them. In order to progress beyond a rebuttal of Hardin, the report calls for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of common property regimes and advocates an analytical focus on local institutions. In particular, the report discusses those circumstances under which local institutions represent an alternative to state management of renewable natural resources. The three themes which have been selected for closer study are coastal fisheries, rangelands management and forestry management. Regionally, case studies from Africa and Asia have been preferred over material from the rest of the world. (author).

50. Kundstadter, P. 1988. Hill People of Northern Thailand. In Denslow, J.S. and Padoch, C. (eds.). People of the Tropical Rain Forest. Berkeley and Los Angeles, USA: University of California Press.

Abstract: The author provides a description of traditional swidden-fallow cultivation management by ethnic Lua farmers. Swidden lands were traditionally considered as common village property and swiddens were reallocated as necessary by village religious leaders. Cutting, burning and planting swiddens was traditionally controlled by the chief priest of the village who was paid a nominal tribute for the right to cultivate. Several rules and regulations were set in order to manage the area properly, according to custom. The traditional system has broken down, however, due to several reasons: (1) increasing immigration of neighbouring Karen peoples; (2) new national laws stating that allforested highlands belong to the state; and (3) the advent of Christianity. The authority of traditional leaders has eroded, and traditional claims on land and usufruct rights are no longer recognized. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

51. Lynch,Owen J. 1994. Securing Community-Based Tenurial Rights in the Tropical Forests of Asia: An Overview of Current and Prospective Strategies. Issues in Development. World Resources Institute's Center for International Development & Environment. Washington, DC.

Notes: The growing crises spawned by tropical deforestation require innovative, comprehensive, and cost-efficient responses. Even these responses will fail in many areas unless the tenurial rights, claims, and potentials of forestdwellers--particularly long-term occupants reliant on community-based tenurial systems--are addressed. The challenges are daunting but the spectre of tropical deforestation requires that governments face them now. (author)

52. Lynch, Owen J. 1998. Law, Pluralism and the Promotion of Sustainable Community-Based Forest Management. Unasylva 194. Vol. 49: 52-56.

Notes: Paper describes how enacting innovative and equitable laws and policies concerning community-based forest management can help local forest-dependent communities ensure that their interests are fairly considered in forest planning and management decisions. (author)

53. Mansberger, J.R. 1991. Keeping the Covenant: Preservation of Sacred Forests in Nepal. PhD dissertation. Geography Department, University of Hawaii, Manoa, USA.

Abstract: This work deals with the place of tenure and rights to sacred forests and groves in the context of religion and society. The author addresses management issues, as well as ownership and condition of the resource. He also gives recommendations concerning their current and future preservation. The collective management situation regarding sacred forests is ambiguous and tenuous but there is scope and hope for improvement based on local concern for this form of common resource. Their preservation is urgent. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

54. McCay, Bonnie J. 1996. Common and Private Concerns. Chapter 6 in Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Hanna, Susan; Folke, Carl; Mailer, Karl-Goran. (eds.). pp. 111-125. Washington, DC: Island Press. 

Notes: Author discusses a number of concepts related to property-rights regimes, clarifying their meaning and raising issues that contribute to the further development of theory related to property rights and the environmental resource base. (editors)

55. McCay, B.J., and Acheson, J.M. (eds.). 1987. The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson, USA: University of Arizona Press.

Notes: This collection of original essays is an anthropological and ecological approach to the theory, the controversies surrounding it, and the phenomenon of 'the commons'. The chapters are grouped into three separate sections. The first, 'Conservation and the Commons', brings ethnographic, ecological, and historical studies of hunter-gatherers and fishermen in the subarctic, the Amazon, Papua New Guinea and the United States to bear on the topics of what conservation is, how it can be measured, and how it is related to common and other property rights. Chapters in the second section, 'Specifying the Commons',address issues of community and the commons, sharing recognition that common property is a social institution. Included in this section are studies of farming, pastoral, and marine communal institutions in Indonesia, Ireland, Spain, Ethiopia, Botswana and the United States. The last section, 'The State and the Commons', includes an economic analysis of public policy concerning fisheries management and three chapters that explore interrelationships among government agencies, local communities, and user groups in commercial fisheries of Malaysia, Iceland and Canada. (Leblanc, 1994)

56. McGinnis, Michael and Ostrom, Elinor. (eds.). 1996. Design Principles for Local and Global Commons. In Young, Oran R. (ed.) The International Political Economy and International Institutions, Vol. II. Pp. 465-493. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

57. McGranahan, Gordon. 1991. Fuelwood, Subsistence Foraging, and the Decline of Common Property. World Development, Vol. 19, No.10: 1275-1287.

Abstract: Ideally, common property can adapt to particularities in the social and physical environment to create environmentally sustainable regimes. In practice, common fuelwood foraging has been subject to numerous problems intimately linked to the historically changing role of common property. Schematic histories of fuelwood and forests in Europe and Java illustrate how common property systems have been undermined, and the different implications their dissolution can have. Both cases indicate that fuelwood problems may be best interpreted within the rubric of subsistence foraging and the decline of common property, rather than that of energy shortage and tree mismanagement. (author)

58. McKean, Margaret A. 1992. Success on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management. Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 247-282.

59. McKean, Margaret A. and Ostrom, Elinor. 1995. Common Property Regimes in theForest: Just a Relic from the Past? Unasylva 180. Vol. 46: 3-15.

Notes: An examination of the current and future potential of common property regimes in the conservation and sustainable use of forest resources. (authors)

60. McKean, Margaret A. 1996. Common Property: What Is It, What Is It Good For, and What Makes It Work? Working Paper.Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome, Italy.

61. Mearns, Robin. 1996. Community, Collective Action and Common Grazing: The Case of Post-Socialist Mongolia. Journal of Development Studies 32: 297-339.

Abstract: This article applies collective-action and transaction-cost theory tothe theoretical debate around the management of common property regimes (CPRs), with supporting evidence from recent empirical research in Mongolian pastoralism. Rather than treating CPR management as an activity in isolation, as much of the existing literature tends to do, this study examines the use of common grazing in the context of other aspects of pastoral livelihoods. The more a given group of herders find reason to cooperate with each other across a range of activities, it is argued, the more likely it is that they will also overcome the transaction costs involved in controlling the use of the commons. The empirical analysis finds that incentives for cooperation were weakened under agricultural collectivisation (1950s-1980s), with possible adverse consequences for the commons. Decollectivisation from the early 1990s has seen the re-emergence of autonomous cooperation among herders, accompanied by changes in intra-community dynamics, which together suggest contradictory trends for the future management of common grazing. (author)

62. Meinzen-Dick, Ruth S.; Brown, L.R.; Feldstein, H. Sims; Quisumbing, A.R. 1997. Gender and Property Rights: Overview. World Development, Vol. 25(8):1299-1302.

Notes: The papers in this special section are the outcome of a conference on Gender and Property Rights. Over 170 people in 29 countries participated in the conference. This overview paper introduces the individual papers, and provides some background on the inception and dynamics of the e-mail conference. (authors)

63. Messerschmidt, D.A. 1986. People and Resources in Nepal: Customary Resource Management Systems of the Upper Kali Gandaki. In Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 1985. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Abstract: The author presents data and an analysis of traditional resource management systems located in two districts along the Upper Kali Gandaki River watershed in north central Nepal. Examples of both local forest and irrigation management systems are given. After this, the common property issues are analyzed according to the Oakerson framework. Physical and technical attributes, the decision-making arrangements, the patterns of interaction and the outcomes of the Nepali CPRM systems are discussed. It is concluded that cultural diversity and diversity of form, function, meaning and use provide a key to understanding how and why common property management systems survive and thrive inthe world. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

64. Messerschmidt, D.A. et al. 1993. Common Forest Resource Management: Annotated Bibliography of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Rome, Italy.

Notes: The purpose of this annotated bibliography is to introduce some of the literature on Common Forest Resource (CFR) Management from Asia, Africa and Latin America. The publication begins with a general introduction to the study of common property resources as it relates to the field of forestry, and follows with separate sections dealing with a particular geographic zone, each with an introduction discussing local systems of resource management, key issues, and an annotated bibliography of relevant literature.  The present resource book borrows extensively from this volume.

65. National Research Council (ed).1986. Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 1985. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Notes: This work represents one of the earliest edited collections of material on common property.

Contents: PART ONE BACKGROUND: 1. The Common Property Challenge (Bromley); 2. Conference on Common Property: An Introduction (Feeny); 3. A Model for the Analysis of Common Property Problems (Oakerson); 4. Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development (Runge). PART TWO CASE STUDIES:  FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES- 5. Marine Inshore FisheryManagement in Turkey (Berkes); 6. Sea Tenure in Bahia, Brazil (Cordell and McKean); 7. Overfishing and Conflict in a Traditional Fishery: San Miguel Bay, Philippines (Cruz); 8. A Social Dilemma in a Less Developed Country: The Massacre of the African Elephant in Zaire (Kisangani). WATER RESOURCES- 9. Common Property Management of Water in Botswana (Fortmann and Roe); 10. Private Rights and Collective Management of Water in a High Atlas Berber Tribe (Mahdi); 11. Canal Irrigation in Egypt: Common Property Management (Hunt); 12. Tank Irrigation in India: An Example of Common Property Resource Management (Easter and Palanisami); 13. Common Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages (Wade). RANGE AND PASTURELAND RESOURCES- 14. Management of Common Grazing Lands: Tamahdite, Morocco (Artz, Norton and O`Rourke); 15. Oukaimedene, Morocco: A High Mountain Agdal (Gilles, Hammoudi and Mahdi); 16. Socioecology of Stress: Why Do Common Property Resource Management Projects Fail? (Gupta). AGRICULTURE LAND RESOURCES- 17. Commonfield Agriculture: The Andes and Medieval England Compared (Campbell and Godoy); 18. Information Problems Involved in Partitioning the Commons for Cultivation in Botswana (Wynne). FOREST AND BUSHLAND RESOURCES- 9. Institutional Dynamics: The Evolution and Dissolution of Common Property Resource Management (Thomson, Feeny and Oakerson); 20. Collective Management of Hill Forests in Nepal: The Community Forestry Development Project (Arnold and Campbell); 21. People and Resources in Nepal: Customary Resource Management Systems of the Upper Kali Gandaki (Messerschmidt); 22. The Management and Use of Common Property Resources in Tamil Nadu, India (Blaikie, Harris and Pain); 23. Minor Forest Products as Common Property Resources in EastKalimantan, Indonesia (Jessup and Peluso); 24. Management of Traditional Common Lands: Iriaichi in Japan (McKean). PART THREE CONCLUSIONS: 25. Closing Comments at the Conference on Common Property Resource Management (Bromley); 26. Issues of Definition and Theory: Some Conclusions and Hypotheses (Ostrom); 27. Concluding Statement (Peters).

66. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Abstract: The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. (publisher)

67. Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; and Walker, James M. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 

Notes: Explores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources. Contributors include Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, James Walker, Arun Agrawal, William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, and Shui Yan Tang. (publisher)

Contents: PART 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND- 1. Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resource Problems; 2. Institutional Analysis and Common Pool Resources; 3. Games Appropriators Play; 4. Rules and Games. PART 2: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN- 5. CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments; 6. Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR; 7. Communication in the Commons; 8. Sanctioning and Communication Institutions; 9. Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations. PART 3: FIELD STUDIES- 10. Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems; 11. Fishers` Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas; 12. Rules, Rule-Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit Between Rule Systems and Resource Use; 13. Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California; 14. Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations. PART 4: CONCLUSION- 15. Cooperation and Social Capital.

68. Poffenberger, Mark (ed). 1990. Keepers of the Forests: Land Management Alternatives in Southeast Asia. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Notes: This volume provides in-depth, historical case studies of forest management as well as tools and techniques for participatory management and community empowerment through social forestry. Case studies from Thailand, the Philippines, Java, and Irian Java are included. (Ford Foundation)

69. Poffenberger, Mark (ed). 1996. Communities and Forest Management: a Report of the IUCN Working Group on Community Involvement in Forest Management. Washington, DC: IUCN. The World Conservation Union. 

Notes: This report from the IUCN Working Group to the Inter-governmental Panel on Forests of the Commission on Sustainable Development gives an overview of global forest management transitionsand includes five case studies from developed and developing countries. The report also lists recommendations on long-term strategies for supporting community involvement in the management of forests. (Ford Foundation)

70. Pomeroy, R.S. (ed.). 1994. Community Management and Common Property of Coastal Fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: Concepts, Methods and Experiences. International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM). Workshop, Philippines. 21-23 June. 1993.

Abstract: Researchers in the social sciences are at the forefront of the urgent search for better ways of managing fisheries resources. The papers in the present volume contain a significant record of the search: they examine the concepts of community management and common property in coastal fisheries; and look at how community management operates in a range of past and present fisheries systems in Asia and the Pacific. (editor)

71. Rocheleau, Dianne E. 1985. Women, Trees, and Tenure: Implications for Agroforestry. Paper presented at an International Workshop on Tenure Issues in Agroforestry. Nairobi, Kenya, 27-31 May. 

Notes: The author raises three important points regarding women's access to trees: the difference between customary and statutory law; the difference between de jure and de facto rights; and the spatial distribution of women's rights. National legislation and policies dealing explicitly with women's rights to trees and tree products is needed. (editors)

72. Rose, Carol M. 1994. Property and Persuasion. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

73. Ruddle, Kenneth, and Johannes, E. (eds.). 1985. The Traditional Knowledge and Management of Coastal Systems in Asia and the Pacific. Jakarta: UNESCO.

74. Ruddle, Kenneth. 1994. A Guide to the Literature on Traditional Community- Based Fishery Management in the Asia-Pacific Tropics. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

75. Schlager, Edella. 1994. Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas. In Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; and Walker, James M. (eds.) Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources. Pp. 247-265. Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan Press. 

Notes: Author provides an overview of the type of institutional arrangements that fishers using inshore fishing grounds around the world have developed. (editors)

76. Scott, A.D. 1955. The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership. Journal of Political Economy 63: 116-124.

77. Singh, Chatrapati. 1986. Common Property and Common Poverty: India's Forests, Forest Dwellers, and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: In this publication, the author considers the exact legal position concerning the current rights of forest dwellers in India and ascertains what can be done for them in future legislation. The subject is discussed in the following sections: property and poverty, forest and people, rights in common, civil rights, economic rights, eminent domain, occupancy rights, public purpose, compensation, the basis for equality, the way to equality and national interest. Most rural Indians depend on CPRs for their energy and housing needs, the dependency being the greatest in tribal areas. One conclusion is that the Indian Forest Lands Acts should be repealed and that new acts should be created, in order to reach a point of equal distribution and use of natural resources. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

78. Singh, Katar. 1994. Managing Common Pool Resources: Principles and Case Studies. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: Common Pool Resources (CPRs) or natural resources used by people in common constitute a significant proportion of the earth's total endowment. Most of these resources are over-exploited and then neglected. This unique work combines theoretical and empirical approaches to CPR development and managementin India. It addresses basic concepts, the role of CPRs, theoretical models for analyzing CPR problems, alternative CPR management systems, instruments of CPR policy, and decision-making tools and techniques. Next, case studies of different forms of CPR management from various parts of India are examined. They indicate that success can be achieved under various management systems, and there is no single best system appropriate for all situations and all times. Lastly, Katar Singh synthesizes the insightsgained from an analysis of the basic concepts of CPRs and analytical lessons and conclusions drawn from the case studies into a coherent and environmentally sound policy for development and management of CPRs. (publisher)

79. Tang, Shui Yan. 1992. Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Notes: Tang evaluates the best conditions and relationship with government for self-governing irrigation systems. The book is an effort to provide answers to the following questions: What institutional arrangements can effectively help in the governance of such natural resources as inshore fisheries, grazing land, and water systems? Is direct management by national governments the most effective way of governing these resources? In what circumstances can local, self-governing organizations effectively ensure the long-term economic viability of these resources? What factors affect the performance of these self-governing organizations? In what ways does government intervention affect the functioning of these organizations? The book is based on the cumulative work of scholars who study the performance of diverse institutional arrangements and on an empirical analysis of the governance arrangements for one type of resource: irrigation systems. (Leblanc, 1994).

80. Thwaites, Rik; de Lacy, Terry; Hong, Li Yong; Hua, Lieu Xian. 1998. Property Rights, Social Change, and Grassland Degradation in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve, Inner Mongolia, China. Society and Natural Resources 11(4):319-338.

Abstract: Dramatic economic growth and policy reform in China have resulted in great changes in resource use patterns. Pastoral areas in the north and northwest are among the area affected by these changes, with grassland degradation identified as a major and increasing problem. We report here on a study undertaken in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve, Inner Mongolia (focused on Baiinxile Farm) where socioeconomic factors, including property rights reforms and open access to grazing land, have combined to promote unsustainable exploitation of the grassland resource by local herders. The study shows that, although biosphere reserves aim to establish sustainable development at a landscape scale, the current property rights regime in Baiinxile Farm associated with social change is driving local resource users toward greater degradation of the grasslands. The opportunity exists to build on existing village-level institutions to develop a participatory communal resource management system to help protect the grassland's biodiversity and productivity. (authors)

81. UNESCO. 1991. Managing our Common Resources. Nature and Resources, Vol. 27, No. 4. 

Notes: This issue of Nature and Resources contains six papers from the Second Annual Conference on Common Property held in Winnipeg, Canada in September 1991. Papers include: Introduction (E. Ostrom); 1. Institutional challenges for community-based management in the Caribbean (Y. Renard); 2. Age, gender and class in the scramble for Maasailand (N. Kipuri); 3. Tenure rights and exclusion in the Philippines (B. Malayang) ; 4. Legislation for livestock on public lands in Algeria (S. Bédrani); 5. Privatization of the sea for seaweed production in Chile (L. Cereceda and G. Wormald); 6. The rehabilitation of forest land in Nepal (M. Karki).

82. Van de Laar, A. 1990. A Framework for the Analysis of Common Pool Natural Resources.ISS Working Paper Series No. 77. Institute of Social Studies. The Hague, Netherlands.

Abstract: The author tackles the issue of property rights regimes in the context of common pool situations. He reviews the literature on CPR management and rights, examining the technical and physical attributes, decision-making arrangements, patterns of interaction and outcomes. His proposed new analytical framework is an attempt to expand on earlier models (particularly the Oakerson model) and to make it relevant to real life situations and useful to professionals from a variety of disciplines. (Messerschmidt et al, 1993)

83. Wade, Robert. 1994. Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Notes: This classic study of village economies in Andhra Pradesh demonstrates that privatization and state regulation are not the only alternatives for conserving and effectively using common property resources in rural societies. (publisher)

84. Walters, J.S. 1994. Coastal Common Property Regimes in Southeast Asia. In Borgese, E.M., Ginsburg, N. and Morgan, J.R. (eds.) Ocean Yearbook II. Pp. 304-327. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

85. Weinstock, J.A. and Vergara, N.T. 1987. Land or Plants: Agricultural Tenure in Agroforestry Systems. Economic Botany 41(2):312-322.

Abstract: In order to understand traditional agricultural systems, especially where agroforestry is practised or its introduction has been proposed, it is necessary to distinguish between rights to land and rights to plants. In this article, rights to land versus rights to plants are viewed in the agricultural systems in Borneo, Indonesia and in Papua New Guinea. Conflicts between local traditional and government policy are discussed. Although villagers used the forest as a common resource, the traditional patterns of ownership and management at the local level have changed. The Luangans of Borneo have developed an ecologically stable and economically viable agroforestry technology because their concept of absolute private ownership of plants meshes well with shared user rights over the land. In Papua New Guinea, clan members who recognize absoluteprivate ownership of plants want to perpetuate communal ownership of their land resources. It is concluded that agroforestry and reforestation as strategies to enhance productivity and sustainability may not readily be applied here. (Messerschmidt et al,1993)

Source of Abstracts

Leblanc, L. 1994. Collective Management, by Communities, of Aquatic Resources: Guide to Research Resources (draft). International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.

Messerschmidt, D.A. et al. 1993. Common Forest Resource Management:Annotated Bibliography of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Rome, Italy. Annotations reprinted with permission from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Tepper, J.D. 1991. Annotated Bibliography of Literature on: Common Property Resources. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.

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